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Notice and Patent Remedies 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Private enforcement systems such as the one for patents have two 
distinct and potentially conflicting goals.  One goal is compensation of 
victims, mainly patentees whose rights have been trespassed.1  The other goal 
is deterrence or punishment of violators, who are mainly patent infringers.2  
While the Patent Act measures the amount of compensation as the plaintiff’s 
losses,3 this language does not exclude deterrence as an enforcement goal.  In 
comparison, antitrust law’s Clayton Act also measures damages by a 
plaintiff’s losses.4  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
deterrence is an important goal of the private antitrust damages system.5 
Because private litigation dominates patent enforcement, we cannot rely 
on a system such as the one for criminal law, where public enforcement tries 
 
 *   Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1. See Edward V. Filardi, The Adequacy of Compensation for Patent Infringement—An Analysis 
of Monetary Relief Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, 3 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 57, 58 
(1992) (explaining that the tort theory of compensation underlies patent enforcement). 
2. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation 
of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–5 (1974) (examining the relationship between the quality of 
enforcement and the effectiveness of laws); Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement 
of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 168–69 (1985) (suggesting that shifting the enforcement 
of public policy from agencies to private enforcers would increase efficiency); William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4−10 (1975) 
(evaluating their proposed economic model of private enforcement by its deterrent effects). On 
patents in particular, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 206 (2004). 
3. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (stating that the plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained”). 
5. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (“Congress sought to 
create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of 
their illegal actions, and . . . provide ample compensation to the victims . . . .”); Am. Soc’y Mech. 
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) (describing one purpose of treble 
damages as “deter[ring] future antitrust violations”). 
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to attain the optimal level of deterrence and a largely separate tort system 
compensates victims.6  In systems dominated by private enforcement, 
remedies perform the very “public” function of determining the optimal 
amount of protection and deterrence.  If every patent was properly granted 
and had just the right scope to incentivize innovation, then enforcing them 
strictly and with harsh penalties would not be a bad idea.  But in the world 
we actually have, where we very likely grant too many patents on trivial 
improvements and too many are of excessive scope,7 nothing is so simple.  
The expected likelihood and magnitude of the penalty determines the number 
of infringement suits and the litigation resources that will be poured into 
them.8  Remedies for patent infringement are thus an important policy lever 
for determining the correct amount of innovation, which is the underlying 
goal of the patent system.9  Penalties that are too stingy reduce patent 
protection just as much as shorter patent terms, severely heightened 
requirements for nonobviousness, or very narrow claim construction.   By 
contrast, penalties that are too broad enlarge patent protection in the same 
way.  If the availability of an injunction or the size of a damages award is too 
threatening, efficient and at least some noninfringing innovations by third 
parties will be deterred.10 
Patent law’s remedial system serves as both a complement and a 
balance to the patent-issuance system.  The strategy of drafting patent 
applications is to claim as broadly as possible.11  The government patent 
 
6. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
180−81 (1968). 
7. See Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Patent Citation Networks Revisited: Signs of a Twenty-
first Century Change?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1671–72 (2009) (suggesting that a decreasing 
patentability standard resulted in a larger portion of trivial, less citable patents). 
8. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability 
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 881 (1979) (listing factors that determine the 
weight of a fine); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 
(1970) (“The offender is deterred by the expected punishment, which is . . . the probability of 
punishment times the punishment.”). 
9. On the goals of the patent system, see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE 
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7–20 (2009); Christina Bohannan & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 909 (2010) (“No legal 
policies are more important for innovation, competition, and economic development than the . . . 
intellectual property (“IP”) laws.”). 
10. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 929–30 (2007) (arguing that the costliness of patent litigation, “supracompensatory 
damages,” and injunctions lead to risk aversion).  On copyright, see Christina Bohannan, Taming 
the Derivative Works Right: A Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in 
Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 688 (2010) (“‘The predictable result [of uncertainty] 
is overdeterrence, as [copyright] users tend to wilt in the face of threats of liability, however 
dubious.’” (quoting David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 152 
(2009))). 
11. See HOWARD SKAIST, STRATEGIC PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (forthcoming 2012); Drew 
Harris et al., Strategies for Resolving Patent Disputes over Nanoparticle Drug Delivery Systems, 1 
NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 372, 376 (2004) (“The first way to resolve a patent dispute is to prevent it 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596789
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examiner then culls out obvious inventions or those that are already available 
to the public, or those claims that go beyond what the applicant actually 
invented.12  Unfortunately, the playing field is not level.  Applicants often put 
many resources into the drafting of patent applications.  On the other side, 
applications are evaluated in largely ex parte proceedings by overworked 
government officials who devote far fewer than the optimal number of hours 
to each application.13  Indeed, the number of hours devoted to patent 
examination is undoubtedly far fewer than the number of hours devoted to 
the mere drafting of a civil complaint in a moderately complex case.  It is no 
wonder that so many issued patents, once litigated, are found invalid.14 
Such a system of patent issuance is not well designed to encourage the 
optimal amount of innovation, but the remedial system can serve as a partial 
corrective.  An optimal system of patent remedies would deter infringements 
when the infringing activity, measured ex ante, serves as a deterrent to 
innovation, but no more.15  The problem is roughly akin to the one 
encountered in antitrust law.  As a result of overly aggressive substantive 
rules, many antitrust violations are also economically efficient.16  Given that 
the vast majority of antitrust enforcement is private, the judicial response has 
been to alter the remedial system by limiting both the range of private 
plaintiffs who are entitled to obtain remedies and the conditions for obtaining 
them.17 
The patent-remedies system also serves to correct patent overreaching 
in a number of ways.  First, the litigants in infringement litigation spend a far 
 
from happening in the first place by having broad, clearly described patents that box out the 
competition.”). 
12. E.g., ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 31 (2004). 
13. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 15 (stating that overworked patent officials spend 
approximately eighteen hours per application). 
14. A high percentage of litigated patents are found invalid, although the percentage has 
decreased since the formation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338 (2003); 
see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005) 
(“[R]oughly half of litigated patents are found invalid.”);  Matthew Henry & John L. Turner, The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation 1, 29–30 (Jan. 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=713622 (finding that the Federal 
Circuit finds a higher percentage of patents valid but a smaller percentage to be infringed). 
15. Cf. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 969, 970 (2007) (arguing that optimal copyright fair-use rules would find violations where 
infringement reduced ex ante incentives to innovate). 
16. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 17.1 (3d ed. 2005); see also WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST 
PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 36–42 (1986) (describing three economic 
inefficiencies associated with the private treble-damage suits); William M. Landes, Optimal 
Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 653 (1983) (“The concept of an efficient 
violation is the key to determining the optimal antitrust penalty.”).  See generally Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 
(1968) (discussing balancing economic efficiency with following regulations in the merger context). 
17. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 912–13 (describing more stringent standing, 
pleading, and proof requirements, among others, and a decreased use of per se rules). 
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greater amount of time and resources than the patent examiner does.18  
Second, the Supreme Court made clear in its eBay19 decision that injunctions 
against infringers are not a matter of right and must be addressed under the 
same equitable principles that apply to other requests for injunctive relief.20  
Third, the Federal Circuit has recently shown a welcome set of concerns 
about lack of strictness in the measurement of patent-infringement 
damages.21 
In his provocative article on patent remedies,22 Professor Golden lists 
five principles, which he characterizes as: (1) nonabsolutism in the 
formulation and application of legal doctrine; (2) antidiscrimination with 
respect to business models; (3) learning (i.e., an interest in fostering the 
production of useful information); (4) administrability; and (5) devolution of 
significant decisional responsibility to private or government actors nearest 
to the facts of an individual case.23  His proposals are thoughtful and well 
defended, but I would add one additional principle: notice.  Specifically, 
remedies must be administered so as to encourage optimal and timely private 
disclosure as well as optimal, cost-justified private search.  The principle is 
especially relevant to questions about entitlement to an injunction, but it also 
applies to the measurement of damages in patent-infringement cases. 
An effective property-rights regime requires a reliable, cost-effective 
system for providing notice, as well as the right set of incentives for 
responding to notice once it is given.  Notice serves the same purpose in the 
patent system as in our system of land ownership.  It is socially wasteful for 
developers to build condominiums or shopping malls only to find out later 
that the land belongs to someone else who is now in a position to extract a 
very large penalty.  Prior to building, the developer may have had a 
competitive choice of parcels, but once construction is completed, this 
market has gone from competitive to bilateral monopoly.  The landowner 
may be able to extract a price equal to the value of the land plus the cost of 
relocating.  For the same reasons, it is socially wasteful for entrepreneurs to 
 
18. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763, 765–66 (2002) (“[T]he amount of time the Patent Office spends examining a patent 
application . . . is approximately the same as the amount of time an attorney may spend searching 
for relevant prior art in the first week of a patent litigation.”). 
19. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
20. Id. at 391.  On the case for limiting injunction rights for patent infringement, see Daniel A. 
Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 253, 263–69 (2009) (suggesting that permanent 
injunctions for patent infringement should be discontinued). 
21. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Grain 
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999); cf. i4i Ltd. P’ship 
v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 856–59 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the reasonableness of the 
damages award); Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 655, 658 & n.16 (2009) (referring to the Federal Circuit’s stricter approach to 
measuring lost profits). 
22. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 505, 551–68 (2010). 
23. Id. at 551–68. 
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develop new processes or products only to discover later that they have run 
afoul of claims in someone else’s patent. 
Effective notice systems generally require collaboration by government 
officials and private-market participants.  The system for land depends on a 
publicly run recording system in which nearly all of the work of describing, 
placement, and searching is done by the private participants in land 
transactions.24  Further, shortfalls in that system are supplemented by notice 
created by “possession” or visible occupancy or use.25  One characteristic of 
property notice systems is that when the quality of the recording system is 
high, relatively less nonrecord notice is needed.26  By contrast, if the 
recording system operates poorly, then participants who do not want to lose 
their investments must compensate by providing additional notice 
themselves.  A second important principle of notice is that the duty to 
provide or obtain it must generally be imposed on the person who can do so 
at the lowest cost.27  Giving notice of one’s own property rights is often far 
cheaper than searching for the possible but uncertain rights of others.  The 
owner of the right knows what she has and need only communicate it to 
likely trespassers, whom are often knowable as well.  By contrast, the 
searcher is looking for something that may or may not exist and that may be 
difficult to find.  We could go a long way toward improving the patent notice 
system by focusing the inquiry not on whether the patentee complied with 
the law, but rather on whether the patentee gave adequate and timely notice 
under the circumstances. 
The real-property notice system, which is less costly and far more 
reliable than the patent notice system, imposes significant duties on private 
parties.  First, the drafter of a deed has a duty to draft clearly without the 
intervention of a government decision maker.  The penalty for lack of clarity 
about boundaries or other essential elements is that the deed may fail to pass 
any title whatsoever.28  The message this conveys to drafters is powerful: get 
 
24. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulman, 262 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
that a subsequent purchaser had constructive notice of a recorded lease but not of an unrecorded 
option to purchase given with the lease). 
25. See, e.g., id. at 366 (requiring that, for possession to impart notice on subsequent 
purchasers, it must be open, notorious, exclusive, visible, and inconsistent with the record title); see 
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 78 (6th ed. 2003) (commenting generally 
on the role of adverse possession). 
26. See Gates Rubber Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (noting that for recorded instruments, 
subsequent purchasers have constructive notice from the record itself, but for unrecorded 
instruments, subsequent purchasers must have actual knowledge or constructive notice of the 
instrument). 
27. SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN 
PROPERTY LAW 1221 (5th ed. 2007). 
28. See, e.g., In re Poteat, 176 B.R. 734, 740 (Bankr. D. Del. 1995) (holding that an inadequate 
description rendered a mortgage deed invalid); Mitchell v. Thomas, 467 So. 2d 326, 329 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985) (nullifying a conveyance due to an insufficient legal description).  A narrow 
exception exists for clear mistakes, such as where the drafter of the deed described a different parcel 
than the one the parties agree upon.  In such cases the court will admit parol evidence and reform 
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it right the first time.  You cannot negotiate and renegotiate with the clerk 
about the description because the clerk does not care.  The accuracy of the 
description will come up, if at all, only at the time of a subsequent 
conveyance or litigation. 
The common law system of notice also discourages inefficient 
trespasses by rules concerning where or how property rights should be 
recorded.  For example, problems result from “incorporeal” interests such as 
use restrictions or easements that affect more than one chain of title.  Such 
interests are similar to patents in that visible markings on the land may not 
provide evidence of their existence.  Suppose that O owns several lots and 
sells lot #1 to A.  To sweeten this deal, O promises to place a restrictive 
covenant on lot #2 across the street, which O also owns, assuring A that #2 
will never be used for commercial purposes.  Buyer A records his deed in the 
chain of title for lot #1 but not in the chain of title for lot #2, which is not part 
of the conveyed land.  Several years later O sells lot #2 to B, making no 
mention of the covenant, and B begins building a store on the land.  When 
sued, B claims that she is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the 
restriction because it was not recorded in her chain of title to lot #2. 
Most decisions protect B’s status as a bona fide purchaser without 
notice,29 and for good reason. When A purchased his lot, he acquired a 
property interest in two parcels: the possessory interest in lot #1 and the 
building-restriction interest in lot #2.  At little additional cost, A could have 
recorded his interest in both chains of title, and any purchaser in either chain 
would have found the interest in a title search.  By contrast, B is in a much 
different situation.  She is purchasing lot #2 and will certainly do a title 
search on that lot.  But not knowing of other possible restrictions, she would 
have to search the titles of perhaps a dozen parcels around lot #2 in order to 
discover whether any of them owned servitudes imposed upon lot #2.  The 
sensible rule is that where recording is much cheaper than searching, the 
burden must be placed on the recorder.  Further, when interests are not 
recorded, the owner’s duty to provide alternative kinds of notice is 
correspondingly expanded.  For example, many short-term leases are not 
recorded and may not be evidenced by obvious acts of possession.  In that 
 
the deed if necessary.  See, e.g., Drake v. Hance, 673 S.E.2d 411, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“If the 
evidence is strong, cogent, and convincing that the deed, as recorded, did not reflect the agreement 
between the parties due to a mutual mistake caused by a drafting error, a deed can be reformed.”). 
29. See, e.g., Nelson v. Barlow, 179 P.3d 529, 533 (Mont. 2008) (holding that a purchaser is 
“not required to examine the chain of title to [neighboring] land to discover an alleged easement 
across his property for the benefits of [the neighbor]”); Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 342 
(N.Y. 1991) (determining that a restrictive covenant that was not in the chain of title did not burden 
the property).  Contra Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 572, 573–74 (Mass. 1975) 
(upholding deed restrictions even though they did not appear in the chain of title of the burdened 
property where deed referred to a plan). 
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case, the lessee’s use must give proper nonrecord notice to bona fide 
purchasers.30 
The patent-recording system offers nothing approaching the reliability 
of the real-property system.31  Notwithstanding an extremely technical set of 
rules for drafting patent claims,32 we have not come close to developing a 
language for them that speaks with the same clarity as the language of deed 
descriptions.33  The extremely technical nature of claim drafting is actually 
part of the problem because patent drafters have an incentive to make claims 
as broad as possible.34  In very sharp contrast, the drafter of a real-property 
deed has very little incentive to draft an overly broad or ambiguous 
description.  The likely result will be that the deed will be declared invalid.  
A closely related problem is that our system for classifying and indexing 
patent claims is not nearly as reliable as most systems for indexing real-
property claims.  These problems have led to patent searches that are 
enormously expensive and also notoriously unreliable35—so much so that 
innovators often have incentives not to search at all and instead accept the 
risk of subsequent infringement litigation.36  Imagine a system for giving 
notice of real-property rights that was so poor that developers found it less 
risky to ignore the record and build first, finding out only later whether they 
actually had a clear title. 
Some of these problems of cost and uncertainty are inherent in the 
patent system, or at least are not easily fixable.  Ideas are by nature more 
difficult to delineate and classify than are the boundaries to land.  As a result, 
 
30. See 1426 46 St., LLC v. Klein, 876 N.Y.S.2d 425, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that 
even though the tenant’s lease was not recorded, her actual possession of the apartment, evidenced 
by her residence, precluded summary judgment that the purchaser lacked constructive notice of the 
unrecorded lease interest); Peck v. A & N Serv. Co., Nos. 86524, 87118, 2006 WL 728757, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2006) (similar); Garmon v. Mitchell, 918 S.W.2d 201, 203–04 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that the presence of grain bins, which were permitted on the property by an 
unrecorded lease, were insufficient to put purchaser on notice of the lease). 
31. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–72 (2008) (finding that the current 
patent notice system “fares badly” when compared with the notice system of tangible property). 
32. See, e.g., ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (6th ed. 
2009) (consisting of hundreds of pages of detailed rules and instructions for patent claim drafting). 
33. On deed descriptions, see KURTZ & HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, at 1159–65. 
34. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1762–63 (2009) (lamenting the focus on claim language, 
which encourages patentees to overclaim in the hope of retrospectively claiming ownership over 
inventions that were not contemplated at the time of patenting); Thomas Chen, Patent Claim 
Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1177–78 (2008) (“Patent 
claims are often intentionally drafted with vague and ambiguous language in order to preserve 
sufficient maneuverability for future litigation.”). 
35. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 31, at 48–51 (recounting Kodak’s costly and 
unsuccessful inquiry into Polaroid’s patents). 
36. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20–22. 
228 Texas Law Review See Also       [Vol. 88:221 
 
the patent-claim-construction reversal rate is very high.37  But conceding that, 
patent law would profit by picking up an important point from the law of real 
property: when the system of public notice breaks down, owners have a duty 
to compensate by providing increased timely and effective notice themselves.  
Such notice should be reasonably calculated to provide known or likely 
infringers with the information they need prior to the time that they make a 
costly, irreversible investment. 
The real-property system has no equivalent of the nonpracticing entity 
(NPE), or “patent troll.”  People do not often surreptitiously acquire land, 
leave it vacant, and then make a surprise announcement of ownership only 
after someone else has developed it.  A routine title search would have 
uncovered the interest.  If the land is described so badly or recorded in such 
an obscure way that a reasonable search could not locate it, the owner will 
likely lose title.  The patent-troll problem results from two separate failures 
in the patent notice system.  The first has to do with the very considerable 
cost of doing effective patent searches, particularly in technologically 
complex areas that are prone to abstraction, and the resulting ambiguity of 
search results.38  The second has to do with the fact that unpracticed patents 
are located only on pieces of paper.  Prospective developers cannot examine 
likely competing products or known processes in order to locate possible 
infringements.  As the Supreme Court once observed, until a “process claim 
has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes 
and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.  It may 
engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”39 
While the problem of unclear patent boundaries is not easily repaired, 
the law could do much to improve the notice situation.  Indeed, the problems 
of implementing an effective private notice system are far more manageable 
than repairing claim drafting and construction or the other complex problems 
of patent interpretation.  The law governing “late claiming,” or patent 
continuations, is one example.  Under current law, applicants may add claims 
to previously filed patent applications, even if those claims are being written 
on inventions that the applicant has observed being developed by others 
subsequent to the filing of its application.40  The logic of this rule is that the 
 
37. Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005) (finding the reversal rate for 
appealed claim terms from 1996–2003 to be 34.5%). 
38. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 31, at 187–214 (focusing on software as examples of 
abstract patents). 
39. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
40. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[N]or 
is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product the 
applicant’s attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.”); accord Tex. 
Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Kingsdown); 
see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examining Patent Examination 20 (Stanford Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1485011, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485011 (asserting that a significant number of 
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patent’s specification, which includes a detailed description, is already on 
record, at least if the application has been published, and this provides 
outside inventors with notice.  The illogic of that position is that if it is so 
obvious to outside inventors—who may have to examine hundreds of 
patents—then why was it not obvious to the patent applicant when the 
application was originally filed?  A significant number of issued patents now 
claim priority to at least one previously filed patent application by virtue of 
backdated enforceability to the time of filing.41  The patent continuation 
process can go on for many years after an initial patent application is filed.42  
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is aware of the problem and has 
unsuccessfully tried to limit it.43 
Late claiming actually threatens appropriate innovation incentives in 
two ways.  First, from the applicant’s side, late claims were not drafted and 
thus presumably not contemplated when the original patent application was 
filed.  As a result, it stretches logic to believe that they were an important 
part of the incentive to develop the invention in the first place.  Recognizing 
such claims seriously threatens to deliver broader patent protection than is 
necessary to promote the progress of the useful arts, as the Constitution 
requires.44  Second, from the potential infringer’s side, late claiming 
magnifies the patent system’s failure to give adequate, timely notice to 
potential infringers.  This induces potential infringers to make investments 
without knowing the risks, placing patentees in a position to leverage high 
damage awards.  In sum, the current system is perverse to the extent that it 
rewards rather than penalizes late claiming. 
 
patentees use continuations to delay the process in order to “modify their applications to track 
developments in the marketplace”).  The Supreme Court responded to a different version of the 
practice nearly a century ago by denying a patent to someone who had delayed a patent for ten years 
under rules that permitted a patent application a delay for preparation of a model and then wrote the 
patent application on technology that was subsequently developed by rivals. Woodbridge v. United 
States, 263 U.S. 50, 52–53, 56 (1923). 
41. See PATENTLYO.COM, Priority Claims in Issued Patents (July 26, 2009), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/priority-claims-in-issued-patents.html (showing that only 
31% of patents have no listed priority claims). 
42. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 63, 71 (2004) (reporting that original patent applications take, on average, 1.96 years 
to issue, while patents with at least one continuance take an average of 4.16 years to issue); see also 
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New 
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1998 (2005) (“[A]n inventor’s 
incentive is not harmed much when, ex post, she is denied patent scope over technology that she did 
not foresee ex ante.”). 
43. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir.) (striking down a PTO 
administrative rule limiting the number of continuation applications and requests for continued 
examination as inconsistent with the Patent Act), vacated and reh’g granted, 328 Fed. App’x 658 
(Fed. Cir. 2009).  At this writing the Federal Circuit has granted the PTO Director’s motion of 
dismissal after the PTO rescinded the disputed rules; however, it refused to vacate the judgment of 
the district court, much of whose opinion read PTO rule-making power very restrictively.  See id. at 
1369 (Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing PTO rule-making power). 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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A good example of the relationship between late claiming and failures 
in the patent notice system is the Rambus case.45  Rambus surreptitiously 
wrote claims on its earlier filed patent application which covered technology 
that was being adopted by a standard-setting organization (SSO) in which it 
was participating.  Because the claims related back to the application date, 
Rambus acquired an infringement action against members of the SSO.  The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the patent was infringed and 
that Rambus had no duty to disclose because the SSO had not been clear 
about the disclosure duties that fell upon its members.46 
But the proper question is not what obligations the SSO imposed, but 
rather what kind of notice patent law’s remedial system should require.   
Looking from the time the continuation claims were drafted, the likely 
infringers were members of the SSO, with whom Rambus was closely 
acquainted.  Indeed, Rambus’ continuation claims were written precisely to 
target them.  One approach that would do more to incentivize socially 
beneficial innovation would be to give late claims only prospective effect as 
of the date the claims were publicized or approved.  Given that the Patent Act 
prescribes that patents relate back to the application date, however, 
implementing such a rule would apparently require a statutory change.47 
A more available approach is to require that a patentee drafting late 
claims provide timely notice to all known and likely prospective infringers.  
The moment Rambus realized that the technology being discussed by the 
SSO might infringe a patent it had applied for, it had a duty to warn potential 
trespassers about the additional claims it was drafting.  The duty does not 
derive from the SSO’s subjective expectations, but from the basic fact that a 
patent is a property interest subject to reasonable property rules about giving 
timely notice.  In this particular case, that duty would have been inexpensive 
to carry out and could have saved many development resources.  Because 
Rambus was requesting an injunction, no statutory amendment would be 
necessary; the court could simply use its equity power to deny an injunction 
to a claimant that failed to provide timely notice.  The real property system 
has done that for nearly two centuries,48 and the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision permits judges to take equitable considerations into account.49 
 
45. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
46. Id. at 469; see also In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 617–19 (1996) (finding that 
computer manufacturer Dell participated in an SSO and certified that it did not have IP rights on a 
developing standard when, in fact, it did); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1018 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying equitable estoppel to enjoin the enforcement of Qualcomm’s patent for 
H.264 products because Qualcomm, misrepresented to the SSO that it was in the process of 
maintaining continuation applications).  For further discussion of the facts and holding of Rambus, 
see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA  & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 712b (3d ed. 2008). 
47. See Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1360 (holding PTO Rule 78, which limited continuation processes, to 
be inconsistent with 35 U.S.C. § 120). 
48. Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143(Ch.) 1143–45 (making enforcement of land 
restrictions contingent on notice to the purchaser at the time of the purchase).  See also James Barr 
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If infringement based on late claims is to be recognized, the remedies 
system must consider why they were late50; however, a rational property 
rights system must also insist on timely notice to reasonably foreseeable 
infringers.  In Rambus, where the patentee was writing claims on technology 
it actually knew was being contemplated by others, that would have entailed 
the giving of immediate notice when Rambus decided to write the additional 
claims.  Then others could make informed decisions about how to proceed.  
This is not a question about the SSO’s expectations, as the Federal Circuit 
concluded, but rather about the kind of notice required by a rational property 
system. 
The patent damages system can also be aligned more closely with 
proper innovation incentives by metering damages so as to create proper 
incentives to give and obtain notice.  On one side the system already does 
this.  The Patent Act permits enhanced damages for willful infringement, 
which occurs when the infringer knew or should have known that its 
technology was infringing.51  Thus, notice by infringers is a statutory 
justification for increasing damages.  But the system also needs to create 
better incentives for patentees to provide notice to anticipated infringers. 
In determining the measure of damages based on a reasonable royalty, 
the Federal Circuit typically follows a potpourri of factors spelled out in 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,52 none of which include 
notice.53  But notice is just as important here as in the injunction cases if 
innovation incentives are not to be undermined.  A good illustration is the IP 
 
Ames’ classic discussion of the problem in J. B. Ames, Specific Performance For and Against 
Strangers to the Contract, 17 HARV. L. REV. 174, 181–82 (1904). 
49. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also Bohannan & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 60–66 (summarizing eBay and exploring its impact). 
50. See Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 31 (asserting that, when late claims are not 
included in the original application because the inventor did not foresee them, those claims do not 
contribute to the incentive to invent); cf. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report 
from the Middle Innings, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1627, 1653–54 (2007) (discussing strategic delays in 
claim filing). 
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285 (2006); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 
858–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (approving enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for willful 
infringement and approving a jury instruction requiring a finding that the patentee “(1) was aware of 
the . . . patent; (2) acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions infringed a valid 
patent; where (3) this objectively high risk was either known or so obvious it should have been 
known”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]o establish willful 
infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”); 
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389  (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative 
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.”). 
52. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
53. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (both applying Georgia-
Pacific factors). 
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Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc.54 litigation.  The patentee was a 
nonpracticing entity that had acquired a patent issued in 1991 to Xerox, 
which was subsequently infringed upon by Red Hat’s open-source computer 
operating system.55  Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit, sitting by 
designation, excluded expert testimony and effectively reduced the damages 
award after concluding that the patented code was only a minor part of Red 
Hat’s program.56 
But another important question was when the infringement plaintiff or 
predecessor owners knew or should have known that Red Hat was likely to 
be an infringer and whether it provided timely notice.  If timely notice had 
been given, Red Hat might have licensed the patent at a royalty based on the 
patent’s fair market value—a procedure that the damages-measurement 
mechanism tries to emulate.  In no event would Red Hat have paid more than 
the incremental value of the patent to its own product, and it would likely 
have paid much less.  In the case of a true bilateral monopoly, the parties 
would have negotiated a price somewhere between the licensor’s cost and the 
licensee’s willingness to pay.  In the more common case of competition, 
however, the price would have been closer to the licensor’s cost.  In this case 
there was no evidence that a significant percentage of users even employed 
the patented feature, and none of the majority of purchasers who used the 
Red Hat system on servers, which do not have a video display, used it.57 
If the patentee has not given timely notice, then it should assume the 
burden of proving (1) that had the infringer been in a position to make an 
informed decision prior to development of its infringing product, it would 
have chosen the patentee’s technology, and (2) the royalty it would have 
paid.58  Evidence that the infringer removed the patented technology upon 
being notified of the infringement indicates that it would not have used it in 
the first place, or at least not at the claimed royalty rate.59  The patentee’s 
 
54. 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
55. The press has widely suggested that the suit was instigated and perhaps financed by 
Microsoft in an effort to suppress the development of open-source operating systems.  See, e.g., 
Chris Coletta, Red Hat Among Companies in Crosshairs of License Suit, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (May 
19, 2008), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2008/05/19/story13.html; Mary-
Jo Foley, Linux Patent Suit: In Search of the Microsoft Smoking Gun, ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=828. 
56. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 689–90. 
57. Id. at 690. 
58. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that courts should look at the noninfringing alternatives available at the time of royalty 
negotiations). 
59. Compare this with the Blackberry litigation, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which involved a software patent- infringement suit against Research in 
Motion, Ltd., maker of the Blackberry.  In this case, RIM knew of the patent in advance, and the 
jury found willful infringement.  Id. at 1291.  During the negotiations on royalty, Blackberry 
developed a software workaround that it stated did not infringe the patent.  Gregory d’Incelli, Has 
eBay Spelled the End of Patent Troll Abuses? Paying the Toll: The Rise (And Fall?) of the Patent 
Troll, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 343, 345 (2009). 
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burden should be particularly strong when it had actual knowledge that a 
particular developer was likely to infringe but withheld notice, as in the 
Rambus case.60  In sum, failure to give timely notice should be penalized, not 
rewarded. 
I. Conclusion 
We have come to think of patents less as a species of monopoly and 
more as a kind of property.  Overall, that has been a good development.61  
Few patents confer serious monopolies and one result of the old thinking was 
a seriously exaggerated hostility toward patents.  But thinking about patents 
as “mere property” threatens to send us to the other extreme, ignoring the 
serious threat to innovation that can result from excessive issuance, excessive 
scope, and—perhaps most importantly—excessive ambiguity.  To paraphrase 
Bessen and Meurer, if we are going to consider patents as property, then we 
must ensure that the system behaves like property.62  A property-rights 
system reasonably calculated to further rather than retard innovation depends 
critically on clear and timely notice, and those who fail to supply it as well as 
those who ignore it should be penalized rather than rewarded.  In this way the 
giving and acknowledgement of notice is an essential policy lever that can 
aid a court in determining the remedy most consistent with the innovation-
furthering goals of the patent system.63 
 
60. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying  text. 
61. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1243, 
1244–46 (2009) (discussing the benefits of this conception shift). 
62. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 31, at 46–72. 
63. On the use of remedies as a policy lever, see BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 9, at 128–30. 
